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Abstract	
Experiences	of	thought‐insertion	are	a	first‐rank,	diagnostically	central	symptom	of	
schizophrenia.	 Schizophrenic	patients	who	undergo	such	delusional	mental	 states	
report	being	first‐personally	aware	of	an	occurrent	conscious	thought	which	is	not	
theirs,	but	which	belongs	to	an	external	cognitive	agent.	Patients	seem	to	be	right	
about	what	 they	 are	 thinking	 but	mistaken	 about	who	 is	 doing	 the	 thinking.	 It	 is	
notoriously	 difficult	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 such	 delusions.	 One	 general	 approach	 to	
explaining	 the	 etiology	 of	monothematic	 delusions	 has	 come	 to	 be	 known	 as	 the	
endorsement	model.	This	model	claims	that	the	patient	holds	her	delusional	belief	
because	 she	 simply	 trusts	 her	 bizarre	 experience	 and	 takes	 it	 at	 face	 value.	 The	
content	 of	 the	 bizarre	 experience	 thus	 plays	 a	 central	 role	 in	 the	 etiology	 of	
delusions.	 Despite	 being	widely	 discussed	with	 respect	 to	 delusions	 like	 Capgras	
and	 Cotard,	 an	 endorsement	 model	 of	 thought‐insertion	 has	 not	 yet	 been	
formulated.	 This	 article	 seeks	 to	 fill	 this	 void	 by	 fleshing	 out	 and	 defending	 the	
endorsement	approach	to	delusions	of	inserted	thoughts.	It	aims	to	show	that	such	
an	 approach	 can	 be	 defended	 against	 objections	 that	 have	 been	 raised	 in	 the	
literature.	In	particular,	it	will	be	argued	that	there	is	nothing	wrong	with	the	idea	
of	being	first‐personally	aware	of	a	thought	which	is	presented	in	consciousness	as	
being	 someone	 else’s.	 The	 upshot	 is	 that	 with	 respect	 to	 delusions	 of	 thought‐
insertion,	the	endorsement	model	turns	out	to	be	a	viable	account	of	why	patients	
come	to	believe	that	someone	else	is	inserting	thoughts	into	their	minds.	
	
	
1.	Introduction	
Experiences	 of	 inserted	 thoughts	 are	 a	 first‐rank,	 diagnostically	 central	 symptom	 of	
schizophrenia	 (Mellor,	 1970).	 At	 first	 blush,	 such	 delusional	 experiences	 can	 be	
characterised	 as	 follows:	 the	 subject	 reports	 having	 an	 experience	 as	 of	 occurrent	
conscious	 thoughts	 that	 she	 claims	 are	 the	 thoughts	 of	 someone	 else	 who	 somehow	
inserts	 them	 into	 her	 own	mind.	 The	 phenomenology	 of	 such	 introspective‐cognitive	
experiences	seems	importantly	unlike	cases	of	hypnosis	or	psychokinesis,	where	other	
people	are	making	the	subject	think	a	thought	(Gerrans,	2001).	Rather,	in	experiences	of	
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thought‐insertion,	 others	 are	 said	 to	 think	 the	 thoughts	 using	 the	 subject’s	mind	 as	 a	
psychological	medium	or	‘bucket’.	This	means	that	it	is	the	episode	of	thinking	itself	that	
is	done	 to	 the	 subject	 (Fulford,	1989,	p.	 221).	The	 subject	 seems	 to	know	what	 she	 is	
currently	thinking	in	a	characteristically	first‐personal	way.	It	is	thus	not	the	content	of	
her	episode	of	thinking	that	looks	to	be	problematic.	What	the	schizophrenic	patient	is	
wrong	 about	 is	 whose	 thought	 it	 is	 she	 is	 accessing	 first‐personally.	 Instead	 of	 self‐
ascribing	the	thought,	she	ascribes	it	to	someone	else.	So,	as	we	might	provisionally	say,	
the	patient	misidentifies	the	thinker	of	the	thought.	1	
The	 topic	 of	 thought‐insertion	 is	 widely	 discussed	 in	 the	 general	 context	 of	
psychopathology	 and	 monothematic	 delusions	 (Coltheart,	 2007;	 Stephens	 &	 Graham,	
1994).	Monothematic	delusions	are	delusions	which	are	 specific	 to	a	particular	 theme	
only.	 Widely	 discussed	 examples	 of	 such	 delusions	 are,	 among	 others,	 the	 Frégoli	
delusion	 (Ellis	 &	 Young,	 1990),	 the	 Cotard	 delusion	 (Cotard,	 1880),	 and	 the	 Capgras	
delusion	(Ellis,	Whitley	&	Luauté,	1994).	 Inserted	thoughts	are	often	grouped	together	
with	delusions	of	alien	control,	such	as	anarchic	limb	phenomena.	The	common	theme	of	
delusions	of	alien	control	is	that	one’s	conscious	mental	states	or	bodily	movements	are	
being	 somehow	 controlled	 by	 another	 agent	 (Roessler,	 2001).	 For	 instance,	 anarchic	
limb	phenomena	concern	movements	of	the	upper	extremities	that	the	patient	does	not	
intend	herself,	even	if	the	movements	seem	to	be	carried	out	in	an	intentional	and	goal‐
directed	manner	(Della	Sala,	Marchetti	&	Spinnler,	1991).	
In	the	recent	literature,	a	popular	explanatory	approach	to	monothematic	delusions	
argues	that	they	involve	more	or	less	rational	responses	to	highly	unusual	or	anomalous	
experiences.	 This	 experience‐based	 approach	 has	 come	 to	 be	 known	 as	 the	 empiricist	
approach	to	delusions	(Campbell,	2001;	Bayne	&	Pacherie,	2004).	 Its	basic	 idea	 is	 that	
conscious	experiences	play	an	 important	explanatory	role	 in	accounting	 for	delusional	
beliefs.	However,	it	is	not	easy	to	pinpoint	the	specific	role	played	by	the	experience	in	
the	etiology	of	delusions.	In	response	to	this	problem,	two	distinct	varieties	of	empiricist	
approaches	have	emerged:	the	endorsement	and	the	explanationist	model.	Proponents	of	
                                                 
1	Throughout	this	paper,	when	I	refer	to	introspective	or	first‐personal	awareness,	I	do	not	mean	to	refer	
to	a	particular,	e.g.,	Cartesian,	way	of	being	aware	of	our	mental	states.	I	mean	only	to	refer	to	the	specific	
way	in	which	we	are	usually	aware	of,	and	normally	know	about,	our	own	conscious	mental	states,	
whatever	that	is.	In	this	neutral	sense,	experiences	of	inserted	thoughts	are	introspective‐cognitive	
experiences	because	the	subject	is	aware	of	thoughts,	i.e.,	cognitive	states,	in	a	distinctively	first‐personal	
way.	
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the	 endorsement	 model	 claim	 that	 the	 delusional	 beliefs	 are	 the	 result	 of	 patients’	
doxastically	 endorsing	 the	 content	 of	 their	 unusual	 experiences	 (Pacherie,	 Green	 &	
Bayne,	2006;	Pacherie,	2009).	Patients	simply	trust	their	experiences	and	believe	what	
they	 seem	 to	 be	 experientially	 aware	 of.	 They	 take	 their	 unusual	 experiences	 at	 face	
value	such	that	the	delusional	belief	inherits	its	content	from	the	abnormal	experience.	
On	the	other	hand,	those	who	advocate	explanationism	about	delusions	emphasise	that	
the	 link	 between	 the	 experiential	 content	 and	 the	 doxastic	 content	 is	 less	 tight.	 For	
explanationist	 accounts,	 delusional	 beliefs	 reflect	 an	 attempt	 to	 explain	 the	 unusual	
experience	via	a	kind	of	rationalisation	or	abductive	inference	(Coltheart,	2005;	Ellis	&	
Young,	1990;	Frith,	Blakemore	&	Wolpert,	2000;	Synofzik,	Vosgerau	&	Newen,	2008).	It	
is	 an	 attempt	 to	 rationalise	 or	make	 sense	 of	 the	 highly	 unusual	 experience,	 and	 the	
content	 of	 the	 delusional	 belief	 does	 not	 need	 to	 match	 the	 content	 of	 the	 unusual	
experience.	 Both	 the	 endorsement	 and	 the	 explanationist	 accounts	 are	 bottom‐up	
approaches	 to	 the	 etiology	 of	 delusions,	 since	 they	 both	 stress	 that	 the	 unusual	
experience	is	the	proximal	cause	of	the	delusional	belief.	2	
These	 two	 forms	 of	 experience‐based	 empiricist	 approaches	 contrast	 with	 what	
Campbell	 (2001)	 calls	 the	 rationalist	 account	 of	 delusions,	 suggesting	 that	 delusional	
beliefs	 are	 Wittgensteinian	 framework	 propositions.	 According	 to	 the	 rationalist,	 the	
words	 that	 patients	 use	 to	 express	 their	 delusional	 beliefs	 do	 not	 retain	 the	 same	
meaning	as	when	they	are	used	 in	non‐delusional	contexts.	The	rationalist	proposal	 is	
best	 seen	 as	 a	 top‐down	 approach	 to	 delusions,	 for	 it	 insists	 that	 the	 unusual	
experiences	could	not	have	their	contents	without	top‐down	loading	(Campbell	2001,	p.	
96).	Top‐down	disturbances	in	some	fundamental	beliefs	are	taken	to	affect	the	subject’s	
experiences	 and	actions.	We	have	 seen	 that	on	 the	empiricist	 approach,	 delusions	 are	
rationally	 intelligible	responses	to	unusual	experiences.	The	rationalist	approach	turns	
this	picture	upside	down	and	claims	that	the	experiential	state	inherits	its	content	from	
belief.	 Delusions	 are	 therefore	 neither	 proximally	 caused	 nor	 justified	 by	 abnormal	
experiences.3	
                                                 
2	Throughout	this	paper	it	will	be	assumed	without	further	ado	that	delusions	are	beliefs	(see	Bayne	&	
Pacherie,	2005;	for	an	alternative	position,	see	Jaspers,	1963,	and	Currie,	2000).	
3	Fleminger’s	(1992)	account	of	delusions	of	mis‐identification	might	be	seen	as	a	third	position	which	
combines	elements	of	both	empiricism	and	rationalism.	His	account	is	a	positive	feedback	model	of	how	
delusional	experiences	and	beliefs	reinforce	each	other.	The	relation	between	experience	and	belief	in	
delusions	is	therefore	bottom‐up	as	well	as	top‐down.	
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Against	this	general	background,	the	goal	of	this	paper	is	to	show	that	an	empiricist	
approach	to	inserted	thoughts,	and	more	precisely	a	version	of	the	endorsement	model,	
can	 be	 reasonably	 defended.	 The	 following	 discussion	 aims	 to	 highlight	 how	 such	 an	
account	can	meet	objections	that	have	been	raised	in	the	literature.	One	objection	to	the	
endorsement	 model	 is	 that	 it	 is	 not	 plausible	 to	 think	 that	 a	 patient	 could	 be	 first‐
personally	 aware	 of	 a	 thought‐content	 whose	 thinker	 seems	 to	 be	 some	 external	
cognitive	 agent	 (Pickard,	 2010).	Against	 this,	 I	will	 stress	 that	 there	 is	 nothing	wrong	
with	 the	 idea	 of	 undergoing	 an	 introspective‐cognitive	 experience	 as	 of	 an	 occurrent	
conscious	thought	that	experientially	appears	to	be	someone	else’s.	That	is,	the	idea	that	
the	attributional	element	of	thought‐insertion	experiences	can	be	properly	experiential	
is	coherent.	There	is	no	need	to	invoke	cognitive‐explanatory	strategies	to	explain	why	
patients	 ascribe	 their	 thoughts	 to	 someone	 else.	 On	 the	 endorsement	model,	 patients	
sometimes	 disown	 and	 attribute	 their	 thoughts	 to	 another	 agent	 because	 this	 is	
precisely	how	the	thoughts	are	given	to	them	experientially,	namely	as	being	someone	
else’s.	I	will	argue	that	this	type	of	analysis	is	coherent.	
It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 experience‐based	 account	 to	 be	 defended	 will	 be	
confined	to	delusions	of	inserted	thoughts.	The	purpose	of	this	paper	is	not	to	provide	a	
comprehensive	 endorsement	 account	 that	 applies	 to	 all	 monothematic,	 let	 alone	
polythematic,	 delusions.	Whether	 this	 can	be	done	 is	 an	open	question	 that	 the	paper	
will	remain	silent	about.	There	are,	however,	reasons	to	be	sceptical	about	whether	such	
an	 ambitious	 project	 is	 feasible.	 After	 all,	 monothematic	 delusions	 do	 not	 obviously	
belong	to	a	homogeneous	class	of	mental	states.	Different	types	of	delusions	like	Cotard	
or	 Capgras	 involve	 significant	 phenomenological	 differences,	 and	 they	 also	 vary	 with	
respect	 to	 their	 neurophysiological	 and	 cognitive	 underpinnings	 (Coltheart,	 2007;	
Radden,	2011).	At	the	very	least,	then,	what	these	data	suggest	is	that	it	is	far	from	clear	
whether	one	single	explanatory	model	could	contain	the	resources	to	comprehensively	
explain	 the	 whole	 range	 of	 monothematic	 delusions.	 Given	 their	 heterogeneity,	 it	 is	
surely	 not	 unreasonable	 to	 hypothesise	 that	 we	 need	 to	 rely	 upon	 the	 explanatory	
resources	of	both	empiricist	and	rationalist	models	in	order	to	explain	distinct	types	of	
delusions.	In	line	with	this,	the	endorsement	model	that	I	will	champion	applies	only	to	
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the	phenomenon	of	thought‐insertion.	Nowhere	will	it	be	implied	that	this	proposal	can	
explain	the	occurrence	of	all	types	of	delusional	mental	states.4	
	
2.	Reports	of	Inserted	Thoughts	
The	 following	 examples	 of	 patients’	 reports	 are	 indicative	 of	 experiences	 of	 inserted	
thoughts.	 In	 each	 of	 them,	 the	 schizophrenic	 patient	 seeks	 to	 describe	 what	 such	
experiences	are	like	from	his	or	her	own	subjective	point	of	view.	
I	have	never	read	nor	heard	them;	they	come	unasked;	I	do	not	dare	to	think	I	am	the	
source	 but	 I	 am	 happy	 to	 know	 of	 them	 without	 thinking	 them.	 They	 come	 at	 any	
moment	like	a	gift	and	I	do	not	dare	to	impart	them	as	if	they	were	my	own.	(Jaspers,	
1963,	p.	123)	
Thoughts	are	put	into	my	mind	like	‘Kill	God’.	It’s	just	like	my	mind	working,	but	it	isn’t.	
They	come	from	this	chap,	Chris.	They’re	his	thoughts.	(Frith,	1992,	p.	66)	
I	didn’t	hear	these	words	as	literal	sounds,	as	though	the	houses	were	talking	and	I	were	
hearing	them;	instead,	the	words	just	came	into	my	head—they	were	ideas	I	was	having.	
Yet	I	 instinctively	knew	they	were	not	my	 ideas.	They	belonged	to	the	houses,	and	the	
houses	had	put	them	in	my	head.	(Saks,	2007,	p.	29)	
Sometimes	it	seemed	to	be	her	own	thought	‘.	.	.	but	I	don’t	get	the	feeling	that	it	is.’	She	
said	her	‘own	thought	might	say	the	same	thing	 .	 .	 .	But	the	feeling	it	isn’t	the	same	 .	 .	 .	
the	feeling	is	that	it	is	somebody	else’s	.	.	.	(Hoerl,	2001,	p.	190)	
In	 addition	 to	 occurrent	 conscious	 thoughts,	 further	 types	 of	 conscious	mental	 events	
can	be	disowned	and	attributed	to	external	cognitive	agents	as	well,	 such	as	 impulses,	
feelings,	and	emotions	(Pickard,	2010).	The	phenomenon	of	mental	disownership	is	not	
confined	to	thoughts	alone.	The	following	report	is	an	example	of	inserted	emotion	(or,	
as	they	are	sometimes	called,	‘made	feelings’):	
I	 cry,	 tears	 roll	down	my	cheeks	and	 I	 look	unhappy,	but	 I	have	a	cold	anger	because	
they’re	 using	 me	 in	 this	 way,	 and	 it’s	 not	 me	 who’s	 unhappy,	 but	 they’re	 projecting	
unhappiness	onto	my	brain.	They	project	upon	me	laughter,	for	no	reason,	and	you	have	
                                                 
4	The	picture	defended	in	this	paper	will	rely	on	a	rather	small	set	of	first‐person	reports.	So,	in	line	with	
what	has	just	been	said	about	the	diversity	of	traits	exhibited	among	cases	of	delusions,	it	might	be	even	
safer	to	suppose	that	the	conclusions	which	will	be	drawn	apply	to	some	rather	than	all	cases	of	thought‐
insertion.	
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no	 idea	 how	 terrible	 it	 is	 to	 laugh	 and	 look	 happy	 and	 know	 it’s	 not	 you,	 but	 their	
emotions.	(Mellor,	1970,	p.	17)	
It	is	not	easy	to	get	a	conceptual	handle	on	these	phenomena,	especially	because	it	is	far	
from	 clear	 what	 it	 means	 to	 take	 such	 audacious	 reports	 at	 face	 value.	 There	 is	
considerable	variation	in	how	patients	describe	what	it	is	like	for	them	to	undergo	such	
mental	 states.	 This	 descriptive	 variation	makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 distinguish	 between	 the	
features	 which	 are	 paradigmatic	 of	 inserted	 thoughts	 and	 those	 which	 aren’t.	 But	
despite	 this	 variation,	 it	 seems	 that	 each	 schizophrenic	 person	 expresses	at	 least	 two	
central	elements	that	these	mental	states	involve.	The	first	is	that	the	individual	holds	a	
delusional	 belief	 with	 the	 content	 <Someone	 else	 is	 inserting	 her	 thoughts	 into	 my	
mind>.	 Call	 this	 belief	 B.	 An	 account	 of	 inserted	 thoughts	 has	 to	 explain	 why	 the	
individual	comes	to	hold	belief	B.	The	second	element	is	that	alien	agency	seems	to	be	
part	and	parcel	of	the	phenomenology	of	inserted	thoughts.	The	reports	strongly	suggest	
that	alien	agency	is	genuinely	experiential	and	not	the	result	of	 judgemental	processes	
which	would	be	additional	and	subsequent	to	the	experience	itself.	In	opposition	to	what	
some	explanationist	models	imply	(Coltheart,	2005;	Synofzik,	Vosgerau	&	Newen,	2008),	
patients’	reports	do	not	suggest	that	they	are	first‐personally	aware	of	normal	thoughts	
which	are	accompanied	by	an	irritating	feeling	of	alienness	or	strangeness,	and	on	the	
basis	 of	which	patients	 then	 infer	 or	 judge	 that	 the	 thoughts	must	 be	 someone	 else’s.	
Such	an	analysis	 is	at	odds	with	how	individuals	describe	their	experiences	from	their	
own	 subjective	 points	 of	 view.	 Instead,	 alien	 agency	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 key	 experiential	
element	 of	 what	 delusions	 of	 inserted	 thoughts	 are	 subjectively	 like	 (Gerrans,	 2001;	
Sousa	&	Swiney,	2011).	5	
In	accordance	with	these	assumptions,	 the	endorsement	model	of	delusions	claims	
that	 alien	 agency	 in	 inserted	 thoughts	 must	 be	 loaded	 into	 the	 very	 content	 of	 the	
unusual	experience.	Schizophrenic	patients	are	supposed	to	hold	belief	B	because	they	
doxastically	endorse	 the	content	of	 their	pathological	experiences.	 In	other	words,	 the	
endorsement	model	strives	to	make	sense	of	 the	bizarre	belief	B	as	an	understandable	
response	to	the	bizarre	experience	as	of	having	a	thought	inserted	into	one’s	own	mind	
                                                 
5	To	say	that	these	two	elements	(i.e.,	belief	B	and	experiential	alien	agency)	are	central	to	inserted	
thoughts	does	not	mean	that	they	have	to	exhaust	the	features	possessed	by	such	mental	states.	It	has	
been	suggested	that	patients’	reports	further	express	a	kind	of	ambivalence	that	schizophrenics	express	
toward	their	inserted	thoughts.	I	will	come	back	to	this	point	below.	
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by	an	alien	 cognitive	agent.	This	way	of	 analysing	 inserted	 thoughts	 is	 faithful	 to	how	
patients	describe	their	delusional	experiences	from	their	own	subjective	point	of	view	–	
i.e.,	 the	 explanation	 is	 phenomenologically	 adequate.	 This	 makes	 the	 endorsement	
model	 attractive	 for	 all	 those	 who	 think	 that	 phenomenological	 adequacy	 is	 a	
desideratum	of	any	satisfactory	account	of	delusions.	
However,	some	psychopathologists	have	wondered	whether	it	is	really	intelligible	to	
take	the	above	reports	at	face	value	and	to	suppose	that	one	can	have	an	experience	as	of	
having	an	external	agent’s	thought	somehow	occurring	in	one’s	stream	of	consciousness.	
Like	 Jaspers’	 (1963)	 and	 Berrios’	 (1991)	 no‐content	 views,	 one	 might	 be	 tempted	 to	
treat	 the	 reports	 as	 incomprehensible,	 nonsense,	 or	 mere	 noises.	 Against	 this,	 most	
contemporary	philosophers	are	confident	that	one	can	escape	such	a	pessimistic	stance.	
In	what	follows,	I	will	discuss	a	popular	strategy	that	is	often	invoked	to	argue	against	
the	alleged	incomprehensibility	of	inserted	thoughts.	This	standard	explanatory	strategy	
makes	 the	 psychopathological	 phenomenon	 of	 thought‐insertion	 understandable	 by	
showing	that	such	delusions	are	also	part	of	the	‘space	of	reasons’.	
The	central	suggestion	is	that	one	has	to	distinguish	between	two	distinct	ways	one	
can	be	self‐aware	of	a	conscious	mental	event	like	a	thought.	These	two	features	of	self‐
awareness	are	the	sense	of	ownership	(SoO)	and	the	sense	of	agency	(SoA).	The	notions	of	
SoO	 and	 SoA	 are	 the	 terms	 used	 by	 Gallagher	 (2000,	 2004).	 Other	 writers	 have	
expressed	essentially	the	same	idea	by	using	slightly	different	terminology.	For	instance,	
Stephens	&	Graham	(2000)	distinguish	a	 sense	of	 subjectivity	 from	a	 sense	of	 agency,	
Gerrans	 (2001)	 distinguishes	 a	 sense	 of	 ownership	 from	 a	 sense	 of	 authorship,	 and	
Campbell	 (1999,	 2002)	 distinguishes	 two	 strands	 in	 the	 ordinary	 notion	 of	 the	
ownership	of	 a	 thought.	 In	 all	 these	 cases,	 the	 core	 idea	 remains	 the	 same,	 namely	 to	
distinguish	between	two	distinct	ways	in	which	an	experience	or	conscious	thought	can	
be	experienced	as	‘mine’.	The	mode	of	awareness	of	both	SoO	and	SoA	is	non‐perceptual.	
Initially	 the	 distinction	 between	 SoO	 and	 SoA	 stems	 from	 the	 phenomenology	 of	
action.	 If	 someone	 moves,	 say,	 my	 arm,	 I	 can	 be	 said	 to	 be	 the	 owner	 of	 the	 arm‐
movement	but	not	its	author	or	agent.	The	action	is	not	self‐produced.	Instead,	the	real	
agent	of	 the	movement	 is	 the	person	who	moved	my	arm.	Correspondingly,	 there	 is	a	
clear	sense	in	which	it	is	still	my	arm	that	is	moving	or	being	moved.	And	there	is	also	
another	sense	in	which	I	am	not	the	one	who	generated	or	initiated	the	movement.	What	
happens	 in	such	cases	 is	 that	 I	 retain	a	sense	of	ownership	but	 lack	a	sense	of	agency	
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toward	my	arm	movement.	In	line	with	this,	I	do	not	self‐ascribe	it	as	my	movement	but	
ascribe	it	to	the	person	who	is	causally	responsible	for	moving	my	arm.	
Based	 on	 these	 assumptions,	 the	 suggestion	 is	 then	 to	 first	 construe	 conscious	
mental	 events	 like	 thoughts	 as	 mental	 actions,	 and	 then	 to	 explain	 them	 just	 as	 we	
explain	physical	actions	(Campbell,	1999;	Frith,	1992).	Many	philosophers	have	argued	
that	 we	 are	 cognitive	 agents	 and	 that	 our	 episodes	 of	 thinking	 are	 mental	 actions	
(Peacocke,	 2008,	 ch.7).	 If	 this	 is	 accepted,	 then	 one	 can	 argue	 that	 the	 core	
phenomenology	 of	 inserted	 thoughts	 is	 constituted	 by	 a	 normal	 sense	 of	 ownership	
coupled	with	an	abnormal	sense	of	agency.	The	schizophrenic	patient	retains	a	normal	
SoO,	i.e.,	a	type	of	awareness	that	it	is	she	who	is	experiencing	the	thought	content	she	is	
first‐personally	aware	of.	It	is	in	this	sense	that	the	thought	can	be	said	to	occur	within	
the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 patient’s	 subjectivity.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 her	 sense	 of	
agency	toward	the	episode	of	thinking	is	abnormal.	For	the	purposes	of	this	paper,	I	will	
side	with	Sousa	&	Swiney’s	 (2011)	version	of	 the	 standard	approach	and	assume	 that	
this	abnormal	SoA	contains	two	important	aspects	in	thought‐insertion.	First,	the	patient	
lacks	awareness	of	mental	agency	toward	the	episode	of	thinking.	This	means	that	she	
does	not	recognise	herself	as	being	the	person	who	produced,	generated,	or	initiated	the	
thought.	The	patient	is	thus	not	any	longer	aware	of	the	particular	episode	of	thinking	as	
something	 that	 she	 is	 doing	 herself.	 The	 second	 aspect	 is	 that	 she	 experiences	 the	
thought	as	something	someone	else	is	doing.	The	occurrent	thoughts	are	experienced	as	
being	produced	by	an	alien	agent	who	inserts	them	into	the	patient’s	mind.	The	reports	
cited	above	provide	evidence	for	the	claim	that	this	process	of	thought‐insertion	by	an	
alien	 agentive	 force	 is	 a	 key	 aspect	 of	 what	 such	 delusional	 mental	 states	 are	
subjectively	like.	
In	sum,	according	 to	 this	version	of	 the	standard	approach	 to	 the	subject,	patients	
experience	 a	 combination	 of	 a	 normal	 SoO	 combined	 with	 an	 abnormal	 SoA.	 This	
dissociation	constitutes	the	core	phenomenology	of	thought‐insertion	experiences.	
Although	 this	 type	 of	 analysis	 is	 not	 without	 difficulties,	 I	 will	 assume	 it	 in	 the	
remainder	of	 this	paper.6	The	goal	 of	 introducing	 the	popular	notions	of	 SoO	and	SoA	
was	 to	 highlight	 how	 reports	 of	 inserted	 thoughts	 can	 be	 susceptible	 to	 rational	
explanation.	 The	 standard	 approach	 relies	 upon	 the	 idea	 that	 inserted	 thought	
                                                 
6	For	an	elaborated	discussion	and	detailed	defence	of	the	standard	SoO/SoA	approach	to	the	
phenomenology	of	thought‐insertion	experiences,	see	Sousa	&	Swiney	(2011).	
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phenomena	are	truly	revelatory	of	two	distinct	ways	in	which	one	can	be	self‐aware	of	
conscious	thoughts.	These	two	core	features	of	self‐consciousness	are	made	explicit	and	
referred	to	by	SoO	and	SoA.	This	fundamental	distinction	allows	us	to	construe	patients’	
reports	in	a	way	that	avoids	irrationality	or	incoherence;	it	allows	us	to	understand	why	
the	 above	 reports	 are	 not	 obviously	 contradictory	 or	 plain	 nonsense.	 Instead,	
schizophrenics	can	be	taken	to	be	broadly	rational	persons	who	correctly	report	on	their	
highly	unusual	experiences	of	thought‐insertion.	That	said,	the	door	is	now	open	to	take	
such	 reports	at	 face	value.	This	makes	 it	possible	 to	defend	an	endorsement	model	of	
inserted	 thoughts,	 according	 to	 which	 delusional	 beliefs	 are	 understandable	 doxastic	
responses	to	highly	unusual	experiences.	
	
3.	Making	Sense	of	an	Endorsement	Model	of	Inserted	Thoughts	
As	mentioned,	 the	main	commitment	of	 the	endorsement	approach	 to	delusions	 is	 the	
claim	that	the	patient’s	delusional	belief	is	the	result	of	her	doxastically	endorsing	what	
she	 seems	 to	 be	 experientially	 aware	 of.	 By	 taking	 her	 experience	 at	 face	 value,	 the	
patient’s	 delusional	 belief	 encodes	 the	 content	 of	 the	 unusual	 experience	 in	 linguistic	
form.	 In	 fact,	 this	 is	what	we	normally	do	 in	everyday	 life	–	we	 trust	our	experiences.	
Upon	seeing	a	cup	of	tea	in	front	of	me,	I	will	usually	form	the	belief	that	there	is	a	cup	of	
tea	 in	 front	 of	 me,	 and,	 if	 I	 am	 thirsty	 and	 like	 tea,	 reach	 for	 the	 cup	 of	 tea.	 So,	 I	
doxastically	 endorse	 the	 content	 of	 my	 experience	 and	 act	 in	 accordance	 to	 my	
perception‐based	 belief.	 Of	 course,	 there	 are	 circumstances	 in	which	we	 refrain	 from	
believing	what	our	experiences	represent.	A	well‐known	case	is	the	Müller‐Lyer	illusion	
where	 two	 lines	 of	 the	 same	 length	 appear	 to	be	unequal	 in	 length	 (Nijhawan,	1997).	
After	having	 learned	 that	 the	 two	 lines	 are	de	 facto	 of	 equal	 length,	we	 stop	believing	
that	the	lines	differ	in	length	even	though	we	keep	seeing	them	as	unequal.	In	this	sense	
illusions	need	not	involve	deception,	and	to	see	is	not	to	believe.	But	it	is	arguable	that	
even	in	such	cases	we	are	at	least	naturally	disposed	to	believe	what	we	see.	This	means	
that	accepting	the	evidence	of	our	experiences	is	the	default	attitude.	The	endorsement	
approach	 emphasises	 that	 this	 sort	 of	 transition	 from	 experience	 to	 belief	 is	 what	 is	
effective	in	delusions	as	well	(Davies	et	al.,	2001).	
Hence,	 in	 thought	 insertion,	 there	 must	 be	 a	 match	 between	 the	 patient’s	
experiential	 content	 and	 her	 belief	 content.	 This	 match	 does	 not	 have	 to	 be	 perfect	
though.	The	subject	can	doxastically	endorse	her	experience	even	if	experiential	content	
is	non‐conceptual	and	belief‐content	conceptual,	i.e.,	even	if	they	differ	in	some	respects	
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(Heck,	2000).	What	matters	is	that	the	patient	arrives	at	the	delusional	belief	B	with	the	
content	<Someone	else	is	inserting	her	thoughts	into	my	mind>	because	she	is	having	a	
bizarre	experience	that	represents	the	thought	she	is	first‐personally	aware	of	as	being	
inserted	or	imposed	by	an	external	cognitive	agent.	
It	 is	 crucial	 to	 remember	 that	 experiences	 of	 inserted	 thoughts	 are	 instances	 of	
introspective‐cognitive	 experiences	 and	 not	 of	 perceptual	 experiences.	 The	 subject‐
matter	of	thought‐insertion	experiences	are	conscious	mental	events	that	the	subject	is	
first‐personally	 aware	 of	 and	not,	 as	 in	 perception,	mind‐independent	worldly	 objects	
and	 their	 properties.	 This	 distinction	 is	 important	 because	most	 arguments	 that	 have	
been	 levelled	 at	 endorsement	 approaches	 to	 delusions	 focus	 on	 the	 content	 of	
perceptual	 experiences.	 Take	 the	 Capgras	 delusion	 where	 patients	 believe	 that	 a	
member	of	their	family	or	near	relative	has	been	replaced	by	an	imposter	(Ellis	&	Young,	
1990).	Campbell	(2001)	argues	that	it	is	hard	to	see	how	a	Capgras	patient	who	believes	
that	his	wife	has	been	replaced	by	an	imposter	could	have	a	visual	experience	with	the	
content	<That	[perceived]	woman	is	not	that	[remembered]	woman>,	except	by	a	kind	
of	top‐down	loading	of	the	experience	by	the	patient’s	beliefs.	Likewise,	it	is	claimed	that	
a	Cotard	patient	who	believes	that	she	is	dead	(Young	&	Leafhead,	1996)	could	not	have	
a	perceptual	experience	with	the	content	<I’m	dead>	because	the	property	of	being	dead	
is	not	a	sensory	property	that	could	be	represented	in	perceptual	experiences	at	all.	The	
objection	 is	 that	 given	 that	 perceptual	 states	 cannot	 have	 such	 basic	 experiential	
contents,	it	is	impossible	to	explain	the	psychopathology	of	delusions	by	suggesting	that	
the	patient	arrives	at	the	delusional	belief	because	she	doxastically	endorses	the	content	
of	her	experience.	There	is	no	such	experiential	content	to	endorse	and	thus	no	possible	
rational	transition	from	experiencing	that	I’m	dead	to	believing	that	I’m	dead.	
But	 these	 arguments	 cannot	 be	 directly	 applied	 to	 the	 endorsement	 approach	 of	
inserted	thoughts.	With	respect	to	inserted	thoughts,	the	claim	is	that	one	can	have	first‐
personal	access	to	a	conscious	thought	that	appears	to	be	inserted	by	someone	else.	The	
awareness‐relation	at	stake	holds	between	the	subject	and	her	own	mental	state.	It	is	an	
instance	 of	 consciously	 based	 self‐awareness	 and	 not,	 as	 in	 perception,	 of	 world‐
awareness.	 Those	 who	 seek	 to	 undermine	 the	 endorsement	 approach	 to	 inserted	
thoughts	 therefore	 have	 to	 show	 why	 introspective‐cognitive	 experiences	 could	 not	
have	such	experiential	contents.	
It	is	surprisingly	hard	to	find	objections	against	the	endorsement	model	of	inserted	
thoughts	 in	 the	 current	 literature.	 Presumably	 this	 is	 so	 because	 an	 endorsement	
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approach	to	 inserted	thoughts	has	not	yet	been	fleshed	out	 in	detail	 (Coltheart,	2005).	
Nonetheless,	 I	 will	 discuss	 six	 objections	 in	 what	 follows.	 The	 first	 two	 are	 mine,	
objections	three	to	five	have	been	voiced	by	Hanna	Pickard,	and	the	last	one	has	recently	
been	raised	by	Matthew	Parrott.	
The	most	 general	worry	 I	 can	 think	of	would	be	merely	 to	 insist	 that	 experiences	
with	 such	 contents	 are	 not	 possible,	 period.	 Call	 this	 the	 incredibility‐objection.	 The	
incredibility‐objection	does	not	 seem	 to	have	much	bite,	 though.	 It	 seems	 to	 rely	on	a	
crude	 form	 of	 experiential	 chauvinism.	 For	 why	 exactly	 should	 such	 introspective‐
cognitive	experiences	not	be	possible?	Is	 it	only	because	people	who	are	 lucky	enough	
not	to	suffer	from	inserted	thoughts	fail	to	imagine	what	such	experiences	could	be	like?	
If	this	is	indeed	the	point,	then	the	objection	ought	to	be	resisted.	The	first	reason	for	
resisting	it	is	that	the	distinction	between	SoO	and	SoA	provides	a	rational	explanation	
of	why	such	experiences	can	occur.	As	mentioned,	SoO	and	SoA	represent	two	distinct	
modes	 of	 being	 first‐personally	 aware	 of	 our	 occurrent	 conscious	 thoughts.	 Being	
owner‐aware	 of	 a	 particular	 thought	 is	 distinct	 from	 being	 agent‐aware	 of	 that	 very	
thought.	To	be	sure,	we	are	usually	not	aware	of	SoO	and	SoA	as	such;	they	show	up	in	
highly	unusual	circumstances	like	delusions	of	inserted	thoughts.	But	if	one	accepts	that	
SoO	 and	 SoA	 are	 two	 distinct	 features	 of	 self‐awareness,	 it	 becomes	 intelligible	 why	
delusional	 experiences	of	 alien	agency	 can	occur,	namely	 then	when	SoO	 is	 intact	 and	
SoA	impaired.	
The	 second	 reason	 for	 resisting	 the	 incredibility‐objection	 is	 this:	 consider	 the	
condition	 known	 as	 synaesthesia.	 In	 synaesthesia,	 people	 report	 having	 unusual	
perceptual	experiences	as	of	 ‘seeing’	sounds	as	colours	or	 ‘smelling’	colours	as	odours	
(Sollberger,	2011).	For	a	 long	 time,	 it	has	been	believed	 that	synaesthesia	cannot	be	a	
genuinely	perceptual	condition.	Most	non‐synaesthetic	people	thought	it	must	be	due	to	
fancy	 imagination,	 to	overactive	associations,	or	 to	an	exaggerated	sense	of	metaphor.	
To	 them	 it	 just	 seemed	 too	 incredible	 that	 there	 could	 be	 perceptual	 experiences	 as	
outlandish	 as	 reported	 by	 synaesthetes.	 Only	 recently	 have	 researchers	 empirically	
demonstrated	 that	 synaesthesia	 is	 indeed	 genuinely	 perceptual	 (Blake	 et	 al.,	 2005;	
Hubbard	 &	 Ramachandran,	 2005).	 In	 fact,	 the	 situation	 of	 non‐synaesthetes	 vis‐à‐vis	
synaesthetic	experiences	is	comparable	to	that	of	a	blind	person	trying	to	understand	an	
explanation	of	what	it	is	like	to	perceive	colours.	A	blind	person	has	no	idea	of	the	what‐
it‐is‐likeness	 of	 seeing	 colours	 because	 having	 colour‐experiences	 is	 plausibly	 a	
necessary	 condition	 for	 knowing	 what	 they	 are	 subjectively	 like	 (Papineau,	 2006).	
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Nonetheless,	 as	 has	 been	 empirically	 demonstrated,	 this	 no	 more	 implies	 that	
synaesthetic	 experiences	 cannot	be	 truly	perceptual	 than	 the	 case	of	 the	blind	person	
implies	 that	 visual	 experiences	 are	 impossible.	 Likewise,	 people	 who	 have	 never	
experienced	 inserted	 thoughts	 may	 fail	 to	 know	 what	 it	 is	 like	 to	 be	 first‐personally	
aware	 of	 a	 thought	 that	 is	 woven	 into	 one’s	 consciousness	 as	 belonging	 to	 another	
cognitive	 agent.	 But	 this	 lack	 of	 first‐personal	 knowledge	 does	 not	 imply	 the	 bare	
impossibility	 of	 such	 experiences.	Much	more	 needs	 to	 be	 said	 in	 order	 to	 reach	 that	
conclusion.	The	incredibility‐objection	should	therefore	be	resisted.	
A	second	objection	against	the	idea	of	the	endorsement	approach	may	go	like	this:	it	
may	be	possible	to	experience	one’s	thoughts	as	not	being	one’s	own,	but	not	as	being	
someone	else’s.	When	SoA	is	impaired	in	delusions	of	inserted	thoughts,	so	the	objection	
goes,	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 of	 non‐agency	 coupled	 with	 a	 feeling	 of	 irritation	 (Synofzik,	
Vosgerau	&	Newen,	2008).	This	lack	of	agency‐awareness	is	responsible	for	the	fact	that	
the	patient	experiences	her	thought	as	not	being	hers.	In	this	sense	the	patient	disowns	
her	 own	 thought.	 Yet	 the	 element	 of	 alien	 agency	 does	 not	 figure	 in	 the	 experiential	
content.	It	sneaks	into	the	patients’	reports	because	they	feel	the	urgent	need	to	explain	
their	 sense	 of	 non‐agency	 coupled	 with	 a	 feeling	 of	 irritation.	 It	 is	 after	 all	 quite	
reasonable,	the	objection	continues,	that	if	I	am	first‐personally	aware	of	an	episode	of	
thinking	as	something	that	I	am	not	doing	myself,	then	it	must	be	done	by	someone	else.	
The	 best	 explanation	 of	 the	 strange	 experiential	 datum	 is	 to	 ascribe	 the	 thought	 to	
another	cognitive	agent,	 true	to	the	motto:	 ‘If	 it’s	not	mine,	 it	must	be	someone	else’s’.	
The	 feature	 of	 alien	 agency	 is	 therefore	 not	 properly	 experiential	 but	 reflects	 the	
patient’s	attempt	to	make	sense	of	and	explain	the	unusual	experiential	datum.	Call	this	
explanationist‐driven	objection	the	non‐agency‐objection.	
Two	points	can	be	made	in	response	to	this	objection.	The	first	is	that	it	is	clearly	not	
mandatory	to	explain	alien	agency	in	non‐experiential	terms.	After	all,	we	are	not	bound	
to	account	for	the	difference	between	an	intact	SoA	and	an	abnormal	SoA	in	disjunctive	
terms,	 i.e.,	 as	 either	 ‘I’m	 the	 thinker	 of	 this	 thought’	 or	 ‘I’m	 not	 the	 thinker	 of	 this	
thought’.	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 Sousa	 &	 Swiney’s	 (2011)	 version	 of	 the	 standard	
approach	highlights	that	in	addition	to	the	absence	of	a	sense	of	self	agency,	there	is	the	
presence	of	a	sense	of	alien	agency.	The	correct	analysis	of	the	abnormal	SoA	is	in	terms	
of	a	sense	of	the	kind	‘Someone	else	is	the	thinker	of	this	thought’	in	addition	to	a	sense	
of	 the	 kind	 ‘I’m	 not	 the	 thinker	 of	 this	 thought’.	 Contrary	 to	 what	 the	 non‐agency‐
objection	contends,	the	proponent	of	the	endorsement	approach	can	just	stick	with	this	
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type	 of	 analysis	 and	 insist	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 one	 to	 be	 experientially	 aware	 of	 an	
episode	of	thinking	as	something	that	some	particular	alien	cognitive	agent	is	doing.	
However,	 it	 is	unlikely	that	 this	response	on	behalf	of	 the	endorsement	model	will	
make	proponents	of	the	non‐agency‐objection	change	their	position.	This	is	so	because	
both	positions	seem	to	rely	on	nothing	but	conflicting	intuitions,	which	are	not	backed	up	
by	any	argument.	Proponents	of	the	non‐agency‐objection	stress	the	sheer	intuition	that	
alien‐agency‐awareness	 is	 not	 possible,	 and	 the	 endorsement	 response	 just	 counters	
with	the	opposite	intuition	according	to	which	such	awareness	is	possible.	And	indeed,	it	
is	far	from	straightforward	with	whom	the	burden	of	proof	rests.	
Yet	 I	 think	we	can	defuse	 the	current	standoff	and	tip	 the	balance	 in	 favour	of	 the	
endorsement	 response	 by	 highlighting	 the	 following	 point:	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 in	 the	
context	 of	 social	 cognition	 that	 we	 can	 directly	 perceive	 other	minds	 as	 other	minds	
(Gallagher,	2008;	Smith,	2010).	For	example,	if	someone	else	is	in	pain,	I	can	be	directly	
visually	 aware	 of	 her	 being	 in	 pain.	 Importantly,	 I	 am	 aware	 of	 her	 pain‐state	 as	 her	
pain‐state.	In	other	words,	with	respect	to	perceptual	awareness,	I	can	be	aware	of	some	
mental	 states	 of	 another	 person	 as	 the	mental	 states	 of	 that	 specific	 person.	 If	 this	 is	
correct,	then	it	follows	that	the	very	idea	of	being	experientially	aware	of	someone	else’s	
mental	 state	 as	 her	 mental	 state	 is	 not	 in	 itself	 troublesome.	 For	 in	 cases	 of	 social	
perception,	we	 truly	experience	 the	mental	 state	of	a	person	as	belonging	 to	 this	very	
person.	
This	 can	 motivate	 the	 intuition	 according	 to	 which	 alien‐agency‐awareness	 is	
possible,	 since	 it	 emphasises	 that	 there	are	 actually	 some	 experiences,	 i.e.,	 perceptual	
experiences,	where	subjects	are	aware	of	mental	states	of	other	cognitive	agents	as	the	
mental	states	of	those	agents.	To	be	sure,	the	example	draws	upon	perceptual	awareness	
and	not	upon	introspective‐cognitive	awareness.	But	what	it	highlights	 is	that	the	very	
idea	of	genuinely	experiencing	a	mental	state	as	someone	else’s	is	an	acceptable	one.	And	
if	this	is	indeed	possible	in	perceptual	experiences,	then	we	have	a	prima	facie	reason	for	
believing	that	it	is	possible	in	introspective‐cognitive	experiences	as	well.	In	conclusion,	
this	means	that	the	 intuition	upon	which	the	above	endorsement	response	rests	 is	not	
without	foundation.	On	the	contrary,	it	is	bolstered	by	a	familiar	example	of	how	human	
beings	can	experience	the	mental	states	of	others	in	the	context	of	social	perception.	It	is	
therefore	 fair	 to	 say	 that	 the	onus	of	proof	 lies	now	with	 those	who	are	 still	 sceptical	
towards	the	idea	of	alien‐agency‐awareness.	
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That	was	the	first	point	that	an	endorsement	theorist	can	make	in	order	to	resist	the	
non‐agency‐objection.	 A	 second	 point	 can	 be	 made	 by	 appealing	 to	 the	 simulation	
account	 of	 action‐monitoring	 as	 it	 has	 been	 recently	 developed	 by	 Jeannerod	 and	
collaborators	 (Jeannerod,	 2003;	 Jeannerod	 &	 Pacherie,	 2004;	 Jeannerod	 et	 al.,	 2003).	
Jeannerod’s	 neuro‐cognitive	 model	 of	 action‐monitoring	 works	 with	 the	 idea	 that	
actions	are	simulated	by	a	central	neural	network.	This	simulation‐mechanism	provides	
the	basis	for	recognising	and	attributing	actions	to	oneself	and	to	other	agents.	By	being	
inherently	 inter‐subjective,	 Jeannerod’s	 empirical	 model	 predicts	 that	 when	 the	
simulation‐mechanism	 is	 impaired	 in	 psychopathological	 cases,	 the	 patient	 can	
experience	her	own	mental	actions,	 such	as	 thoughts,	as	someone	else’s.	 If	 this	neuro‐
cognitive	model	of	the	experiential	 factor	 in	thought‐insertion	is	correct,	 then	we	have	
empirical	 evidence	 that	 lends	 support	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 alien	agency	 can	be	part	of	 the	
experiential	 content	 of	 inserted	 thoughts.	 The	 challenge	 raised	 by	 the	 non‐agency‐
objection	can	thus	be	met.	
Note	 that	 it	 is	 important	 not	 to	 conflate	 the	 incredibility‐objection	 and	 the	 non‐
agency‐objection	with	a	different	but	adjacent	concern,	which	is	whether	experiences	of	
inserted	 thoughts	 represent	 states	 of	 affairs	 that	 can	 possibly	 obtain.	 Coliva	 (2002a,	
2002b),	for	example,	argues	that	it	 is	not	a	genuine	possibility	for	a	subject	to	be	first‐
personally	aware	of	a	thought	and	yet	not	be	its	agent.7	According	to	her,	if	one	is	first‐
personally	aware	of	an	occurrent	conscious	thought,	then	it	must	be	one’s	own,	and	this	
is	 a	 conceptual	 point.	 Mental	 ownership	 and	 mental	 agency	 are	 not	 two	 conditions	
which	are	independent	from	each	other.	It	is	not	that	the	first	could	obtain	without	the	
second.	So	no	one	could	have	a	 first‐personal	access	 to	a	mental	 state	which	 is	not	de	
facto	hers.	
The	way	 I	understand	Coliva’s	 concern	 is	 this:	 experiences	of	 inserted	 thoughts	as	
characterised	 by	 the	 endorsement	 approach	 are	 possible	 even	 though	 their	
representational	 content	 is	 strictly	 incoherent.	 If	 this	 interpretation	 is	 correct,	 then	 it	
follows	that	inserted	thought	experiences	can	be	compared	to	Escher	drawings.	Escher	
drawings	are	examples	of	pictures	that	represent	or	depict	spatially	impossible	figures,	
                                                 
7	The	general	context	within	which	Coliva’s	discussion	takes	place	is	whether	first‐personal	present‐tense	
ascriptions	of	mental	states	are	logically	immune	to	error	through	misidentification.	A	statement	like	‘I	am	
in	pain’	is	said	to	be	logically	immune	to	error	through	misidentification	if	there	is	no	possible	world	in	
which	I	could	be	wrong	with	respect	to	whether	it	is	really	me	who	is	in	pain.	For	a	discussion	and	defence	
of	this	idea,	see	Shoemaker	(1968).	
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i.e.,	 figures	 which	 are	 experienced	 to	 have	 paradoxical	 perceptible	 features	 such	 as	
inconsistent	geometrical	properties	that	no	physically	real	object	can	have	(Macpherson,	
2010).	 Even	 if	 the	 content	 of	 such	 drawings	 is	 incoherent,	 one	 can	 provide	 a	 rational	
explanation	for	the	individual	parts	that	the	impossible	figure	is	divisible	into,	because	
each	part	is	perfectly	possible.	Experiences	of	inserted	thoughts	might	be	like	that:	their	
content	 is	 incoherent	 even	 though	 one	 can	make	 sense	 of	 the	 parts	 they	 are	 divisible	
into,	 i.e.,	mental	ownership	and	mental	agency.	 In	contrast	to	 the	foregoing	objections,	
Coliva	does	 therefore	not	seem	to	have	problems	accepting	 the	possible	occurrence	of	
experiences	where	the	alien	agency	aspect	is	a	feature	of	their	basic	content.	Rather,	she	
is	opposed	to	the	idea	that	such	experiences	could	be	veridical.	These	two	points	must	
be	carefully	distinguished	and	it	is	important	to	realise	that	nothing	prevents	a	fan	of	an	
endorsement	 model	 of	 inserted	 thoughts	 to	 side	 with	 Coliva’s	 position.	 The	 point	 at	
stake	 for	 the	 endorsement	model	 is	whether	 such	 introspective‐cognitive	 experiences	
themselves	are	possible	and	not	whether	what	they	represent	is	possible.	
After	these	clarifications,	let’s	come	back	to	the	objections	to	the	endorsement	view.	
Pickard	(2010)	has	recently	raised	some	specific	objections	to	the	idea	that	it	is	possible	
to	have	an	experience	as	of	having	 first‐personal	access	to	a	 thought	which	belongs	to	
someone	else.	Pickard	argues	that	the	attributional	element	of	 inserted	thoughts	is	not	
part	of	 the	unusual	experience’s	basic	content.	For	her,	 the	subject’s	attribution	of	 the	
thought	 to	 another	 cognitive	 agent	 is	 likely	 to	be	 the	 result	 of	 dysfunctional	 cognitive	
processes	that	are	subsequent	to	the	experiential	anomaly.	In	other	words,	she	contends	
that	the	attributional	element	of	thought‐insertion	kicks	in	only	at	the	cognitive	level	of	
belief‐fixation	and	belief‐maintenance,	which	 is	subsequent	 to	 the	aberrant	experience	
itself.	Pickard’s	reasons	for	rejecting	the	endorsement	approach	to	inserted	thoughts	are	
contained	in	the	following	passage:	
Consider	 again	 the	 range	 of	 objects	 of	 attribution	 in	 the	 above	 patient	 reports.	 Their	
variety,	 idiosyncrasy,	 and	 detail,	 makes	 it	 highly	 implausible	 to	 think	 that	 the	
attributional	 component	of	 alien	 thoughts,	 impulses,	 and	 feelings	 could	be	part	of	 the	
initial,	wayward	experience.	How	could	the	first	 factor	of	the	delusional	process	be	an	
experience	that	presents	a	mental	event	as	belonging	to	Chris,	let	alone	to	the	distant	x‐
ray	department,	 ‘they’,	or	some	nearby	houses?	For,	 in	some	of	these	cases,	the	object	
itself	 is	 not	 even	 experienced	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 delusion;	 in	 others,	 although	
experienced,	 it	 is	not	 evident,	 to	 say	 the	 least,	 that	or	how	 it	 could	be	experienced	as	
possessing	the	mental	event	in	question.	(Pickard,	2010,	p.	58)	
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Let	me	first	say	that	it	is	not	entirely	clear	to	me	what	Pickard’s	objections	are	meant	to	
be.	 The	 following	 discussion	 will	 therefore	 rest	 upon	my	 interpretation	 of	 the	 above	
passage.	To	start	with,	I	suggest	that	three	distinct	but	somewhat	interrelated	objections	
can	be	isolated.	
1)	 	The	 objects	 to	 which	 patients	 attribute	 their	 inserted	 thoughts	 are	 hugely	
heterogeneous.	For	the	thoughts	are	not	solely	attributed	to	other	people	but	
also	 to	 x‐ray	 departments,	 nearby	 houses,	machines,	 groups	 of	 people,	 and	
the	 like.	 Given	 that	 the	 objects	 of	 attribution	 do	 not	 form	 a	 homogeneous	
class,	it	is	implausible	to	think	that	alien	agency	is	experiential.	
2)	It	is	hard	to	understand	how	the	alleged	objects	of	thought‐attribution	could	
be	experienced	as	possessing	the	conscious	thought	in	question.	This	makes	it	
doubtful	 that	 the	 thought	 in	 question	 could	 be	 experienced	 as	 belonging	 to	
those	objects.	
3)		In	 some	 cases	 of	 delusions,	 the	 object	 X	 of	 thought‐attribution	 is	 not	
experienced	at	all.	So	how	could	one’s	thought	be	presented	in	consciousness	
as	being	X’s?	
I	will	discuss	these	three	objections	one	after	another.	But	before	doing	this,	two	general	
points	 should	 be	 noticed.	 First,	 Pickard’s	 attack	 turns	 on	 the	 nature	 and	 status	 of	 the	
objects	 the	 thoughts	 are	 attributed	 to.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 it	 is	 the	 specificity	 and	
heterogeneity	of	 those	objects	of	 thought‐attribution	 that	her	objections	 are	primarily	
based	upon.	And	second,	she	seems	to	shift	the	problem	of	content	from	introspective‐
cognitive	 experiences	 to	 perceptual	 experiences.	 This	 is	 especially	 vivid	 in	 2)	 and	 3)	
where	 the	use	of	 ‘experience’	 is	obviously	meant	 to	refer	 to	perceptual	awareness	and	
not	 to	 introspective‐cognitive	awareness.	A	discussion	of	Pickard’s	objections	has	 thus	
to	be	careful	not	to	mix	up	introspective‐cognitive	awareness	and	perceptual	awareness.	
That	 said,	 I	 do	 not	 think	 that	 objection	 1)	 is	 very	 troublesome.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	
objects	of	attribution	form	a	heterogeneous	class	is	something	we	are	familiar	with	from	
perception.	 Ordinary	 perception	 presents	 us	 with	 a	 huge	 variety	 of	 objects	 and	 their	
features,	 like	 material	 three‐dimensional	 objects,	 rainbows,	 black	 holes,	 ephemeral	
objects	like	soap‐bubbles	and	shadows,	and	maybe	also	affordances,	causal	and	natural	
kind	properties,	and	values	(Siegel,	2010).	Except	for	being	objects	of	perception,	these	
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objects	fail	to	belong	to	a	genuine	class.	Analogously,	one	can	suppose	that	a	conscious	
mental	event	 like	an	episodic	 thought	can	be	presented	 in	 introspective	experience	as	
belonging	to	a	variety	of	distinct	objects	as	well.	Typically	I	knowledgeably	self‐ascribe	
the	 thought,	 i.e.,	 I	myself	 am	 the	 object	 of	 attribution.	 In	 delusional	 cases,	 however,	 I	
ascribe	 it	 to	other	entities.	And	when	 this	happens	 it	 is	not	clear	why	 there	should	be	
any	 restriction	as	 to	what	ontological	 category	 the	object	of	 attribution	can	belong	 to,	
just	 like	 in	 the	case	of	perceptual	experiences.	On	 the	 face	of	 it,	 the	supposition	 that	a	
conscious	 mental	 event	 like	 a	 thought	 can	 be	 experientially	 attributed	 to	 variegated	
objects	does	not	seem	outrageous.	
One	 might	 object	 to	 this	 by	 claiming	 that	 the	 analogy	 between	 perception	 and	
introspection	 fails	 here.	 Even	 if	 heterogeneity	 is	 unproblematic	 in	 the	 case	 of	
perceptually	 attributing	 features	 to	 objects,	 it	 might	 be	 problematic	 in	 the	 case	 of	
introspectively	attributing	thoughts	to	objects	other	than	oneself.	
In	reply,	a	proponent	of	the	endorsement	account	can	stress	that	it	is	certainly	true	
that	 perceptual	 awareness	 and	 introspective	 awareness	 are	 distinct	 in	 important	
respects.	This	 is	not	 in	dispute.	Therefore	what	 is	 true	for	one	type	of	awareness	does	
not	automatically	carry	over	to	the	other	type	of	awareness.	But	the	foregoing	answer	to	
objection	1)	draws	upon	the	more	specific	idea	that	the	analogy	between	perception	and	
introspection	 is	 kosher	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 heterogeneous	 nature	 of	 the	 objects	 of	
attribution.	 If	 one	 thinks	 that	 this	move	 is	 not	permitted,	 then	one	has	 to	 add	 further	
reasons	why	this	should	be	so.	The	onus	of	proof	is	on	the	sceptic’s	side.	
Like	Pickard,	Martin	&	Pacherie	(2013)	also	stress	the	idea	of	objection	1)	in	order	
to	claim	that	alien	agency	is	not	fundamentally	experiential	but	the	result	of	a	cognitive	
process	 of	 interpretation.	 Moreover,	 they	 argue	 that	 this	 kind	 of	 interpretation	 is	
influenced	by	cultural	factors,	which	is	why	patients	attribute	their	inserted	thoughts	to	
a	heterogeneous	class	of	entities.	According	to	Martin	&	Pacherie’s	way	of	 framing	the	
idea	of	objection	1),	the	heterogeneity	of	objects	of	thought‐attribution	is	therefore	the	
result	of	patients’	interpretations	being	influenced	by	various	cultural	factors.	
In	addition	to	what	has	already	been	said	before,	a	proponent	of	 the	endorsement	
approach	does	not	need	to	deny	that	cultural	factors	may	indeed	play	an	important	role	
in	the	pathogenesis	of	inserted	thoughts.	In	fact,	multiple	factors	may	contribute	to	the	
occurrence	 of	 the	 delusional	 experience,	 such	 as	 cultural	 factors,	 context,	 background	
knowledge,	expectations,	unconscious	processing,	memories,	affective	states,	and	so	on	
(Fleminger,	1992).	But	the	important	point	to	note	is	that	these	multiple	factors	may	be	
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relevant	to	determining	the	experiential	content	of	the	delusion	itself.	In	order	to	explain	
why	 the	 patient	 has	 a	 delusional	 experience	 with	 the	 content	 <Chris	 is	 inserting	
thoughts	 into	my	mind>	 and	 not	 <Penelope	 is	 inserting	 thoughts	 into	my	mind>,	 one	
may	well	be	required	to	refer	to	the	patient’s	background	knowledge	or	context	in	which	
the	delusion	occurs.	For	example,	the	patient	might	see	Chris	standing	right	 in	front	of	
her	at	the	time	of	the	delusion,	or	she	might	be	remembering	that	Chris	is	an	old	friend	
of	 hers,	 or	whatever.	 It	 is	 an	 open	 empirical	 question	whether,	 and	 how,	 factors	 like	
these	influence	the	pathogenesis	of	experiences	of	thought‐insertion.	Yet	it	is	crucial	to	
realise	that	such	potential	etiological	factors	do	not	have	to	be	viewed	as	influencing	the	
patient’s	 interpretation	of	 her	 experience.	 Instead,	we	 can	 think	of	 them	as	 important	
factors	 in	 the	 pathogenesis	 of	 the	 delusional	 experience	 as	 of	 having	 someone	 else’s	
thought;	i.e.,	they	can	contribute	to	determining	the	experiential	content	of	the	delusion.	
The	 fan	 of	 the	 endorsement	 model	 can	 therefore	 readily	 agree	 that	 cultural	 factors,	
context,	background	knowledge,	affective	states,	and	so	on,	can	play	an	important	role	in	
explaining	why	patients	attribute	their	thoughts	to	a	heterogeneous	class	of	objects.	
Let’s	now	 turn	 to	objection	2).	This	objection	must	be	 split	 in	 two	 steps.	The	 first	
step	emphasises	that	it	might	not	be	possible	to	be	perceptually	aware	of	the	objects	of	
thought‐attribution	 as	 thinkers	 (i.e.,	 as	 cognitive	 agents).8	 The	 rationale	 for	 this	 step	
stems	from	patients’	reports	such	as	Elyn	Saks’	(2007).	At	the	time	of	the	delusion,	Saks	
experiences	 her	 thoughts	 as	 belonging	 to	 the	 very	 same	 houses	 that	 she	 is	 currently	
seeing.	 In	 circumstances	 like	 these,	 the	 object	 that	 the	 patient	 attributes	 her	 own	
conscious	thought	to	is	therefore	the	same	object	that	she	is	perceptually	aware	of.	Such	
perceptual	 experiences	 seem	 to	 be	 quite	 prevalent	 in	 personal	 accounts	 of	 the	
phenomenon.	Presumably	this	is	the	main	reason	why	Pickard	concentrates	so	much	on	
the	issue	of	perceptual	awareness.	
The	 second	 step	of	 objection	2)	 concludes	 that	 if	 a	 subject	 cannot	be	perceptually	
aware	of	a	worldly	object	X	as	being	the	thinker	of	the	inserted	thought,	then	she	cannot	
be	introspectively	aware	of	the	thought	as	being	X’s	either.	 I	 think	both	steps	fail.	Step	
two	 can	be	 resisted	 if	 one	grants	 that	 the	 range	of	 objects	 that	one	 can	experience	as	
cognitive	 agents	 is	 wider	 in	 introspection	 than	 in	 perception.	 After	 all,	 it	 might	 be	
possible	to	first‐personally	experience	X	as	being	the	agent	of	one’s	thought	even	though	
                                                 
8	As	mentioned	before,	I	take	Pickard’s	use	of	‘experience’	in	objection	2)	and	3)	to	refer	to	perceptual	
awareness	and	not	to	introspective‐cognitive	awareness.	
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it	is	impossible	to	perceptually	experience	X	as	being	a	cognitive	agent.	However,	I	will	
not	 go	 into	 more	 detail	 with	 respect	 to	 step	 two.	 Instead,	 my	 aim	 is	 to	 undermine	
objection	2)	by	directly	tackling	the	first	step.	
In	order	to	dismiss	the	first	step	of	objection	2),	one	can	highlight	that	human	beings	
are	keen	to	attribute	conscious	and	intentional	mental	states	to	a	huge	variety	of	entities	
all	 the	 time,	 such	 as	 cartoon	 characters	 like	 Mickey	 Mouse	 or	 mythical	 and	 fictional	
creatures	like	dragons,	gremlins,	and	the	like.	It	is	common	sense	that	we	automatically	
ascribe	complex	mental	states	 to	such	non‐human	beings.	The	 idea	 that	human	beings	
can	experience	a	huge	range	of	distinct	entities	as	minded	or	animate	beings	is	therefore	
not	in	itself	troublesome.	
What	 is	more,	 psychological	 experiments	 on	 social	 perception	 have	 demonstrated	
that	 human	 beings	 automatically	 attribute	 numerous	 mental	 properties	 to	 simple	
stimuli	 with	 geometrical	 and	 temporal	 features	 as	 soon	 as	 such	 stimuli	 were	 shown	
moving	 in	various	directions	 and	at	different	 speeds	 (Heider	&	Simmel,	 1944).	 In	 this	
specific	experiment,	subjects	are	shown	a	short	movie	in	which	two	line‐drawn	triangles	
and	a	circle	instantiate	distinct	temporal	and	spatial	properties.9	The	interesting	result	is	
that	 although	 subjects	 who	 are	 watching	 the	 movie	 do	 not	 believe	 that	 these	 simple	
geometrical	 figures	 are	 minded	 beings,	 a	 large	 majority	 of	 them	 cannot	 refrain	 from	
imbuing	the	figures	with	agency	and	elaborated	mentality.	In	fact,	most	subjects	see	the	
triangles	 and	 circle	 as	 agents	with	numerous	 intentional	 and	 conscious	mental	 states.	
For	 instance,	 they	report	seeing	the	 large	triangle	chasing	the	circle,	or	seeing	the	two	
triangles	 fighting	against	 each	other.	The	 small	 triangle	 is	 further	described	as	heroic,	
brave,	 courageous,	 and	 fearless,	whereas	 the	 large	 triangle	 is	 described	 as	 aggressive	
and	irritable.	
The	crucial	point	of	Heider	&	Simmel’s	experiment	for	our	purposes	is	that	it	can	be	
interpreted	as	showing	that	subjects	genuinely	experience	simple	geometrical	forms	as	
animated	beings.	From	a	phenomenological	point	of	view,	it	is	not	that	subjects	merely	
experience	 spatial	 and	 temporal	 properties	 of	 inanimate	 geometrical	 figures	 and	 then	
come	 to	 believe	 and	 judge	 that	 they	 are	 minded	 beings.	 The	 activity	 of	 property‐
attribution	does	not	seem	to	be	judgemental.	Such	an	interpretation	is	at	odds	with	how	
the	 scene	 in	 the	 experiment	 is	 experienced	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 most	 subjects.	
                                                 
9	The	interested	reader	who	would	like	to	watch	Heider	&	Simmel’s	(1944)	short	movie	can	do	this	by	
clicking	on	the	following	link:	http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=76p64j3H1Ng	
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Rather	 it	 seems	 to	 be	 part	 of	 the	 basic	 visual	 content	 that	 one	 experiences	 the	
geometrical	 figures	as	animated.	That	is,	 it	 is	the	visual	experience	itself	which	imbues	
the	triangles	and	the	circle	with	various	mental	properties.	This	result	is	important	since	
it	 demonstrates	 that	 very	 simple	 objects	 can	 be	 perceptually	 given	 to	 us	 as	 minded	
beings.	
Heider	 &	 Simmel’s	 experiment	 can	 be	 compared	 to	 the	 Müller‐Lyer	 illusion	
mentioned	 before.	 Although	 subjects	 do	 not	 believe	 that	 the	 line‐drawn	 triangles	 and	
circles	are	real	agents	and	subjects	of	mental	states,	they	keep	seeing	them	as	such.	This	
is	a	case	of	illusion	because	subjects	ascribe	mental	features	to	objects	of	perception	that	
they	do	not	possess;	i.e.,	the	simple	geometrical	stimuli	perceptually	appear	other	than	
they	really	are.	And	just	as	in	the	Müller‐Lyer	illusion,	subjects	are	not,	or	need	not	be,	
deceived	by	what	they	see.	
Overall,	 these	 considerations	 highlight	 that	 a	 huge	 variety	 of	 objects	 can	 be	
perceived	by	us	as	minded	beings	in	non‐delusional	contexts.	To	propose	that	patients	
like	Elyn	Saks	can	have	perceptual	experiences	as	of	thinking	houses	therefore	does	not	
seem	 particularly	 awkward.	 Instead,	 it	 should	 be	 viewed	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 our	
naturally	 evolved	 tendency	 to	 experience	 objects	 as	 minded,	 i.e.,	 as	 possessing	
intentional	and	conscious	mental	states	of	various	sorts.	This,	then,	is	how	objection	2)	
can	be	deflated.	
Now	 let’s	 address	 objection	 3).	 Pickard	 is	 surely	 right	 to	 state	 that	 the	 object	 of	
thought‐attribution	is	not	always	experienced	at	the	time	of	the	delusion.	In	contrast	to	
Saks	who	 is	 seeing	 the	 houses,	 patients	 sometimes	 attribute	 their	 thoughts	 to	 objects	
that	are	not	present	in	their	immediate	vicinity.	But	why	exactly	is	this	supposed	to	be	
problematic?	 In	 which	 sense	 is	 this	 relevant	 for	 knowing	 whether	 the	 episode	 of	
thinking	itself	can	be	experienced	as	being	done	by	an	external	agent?	It	seems	enough	
that	 the	 conscious	 thought	 is	 experientially	 present;	 whether	 the	 object	 of	 thought‐
attribution	is	perceptually	present	or	not	seems	beside	the	point.	
In	 fact,	 I	 think	 objection	 3)	 is	mixing	 up	 perceptual	 awareness	with	 first‐personal	
awareness.	 The	 patient	 might	 be	 perceptually	 aware	 of	 the	 objects	 of	 thought‐
attribution,	or	she	might	not.	This	is	just	one	aspect	of	the	patient’s	overall	mental	state	
at	the	time	of	the	delusion.	But	the	central	aspect	is	the	subject’s	being	first‐personally	
aware	of	an	episode	of	thinking	that	appears	to	be	done	by	some	other	agent.	As	already	
mentioned	before,	whether/how	perceptual	 awareness	 influences	 the	 pathogenesis	 of	
delusions	of	inserted	thoughts	is	an	open	question.	In	Saks’	example,	it	seems	likely	that	
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seeing	the	houses	plays	a	part	in	determining	the	content	of	her	delusional	experience,	
i.e.,	 that	her	 inserted	 thoughts	appear	 to	her	as	belonging	 to	 the	houses.	Still,	whether	
this	 is	 true	 or	 false	 is	 an	 empirical	 question	 that	 cannot	 be	 answered	 from	 the	
philosopher’s	 armchair.	 Luckily,	 the	 proponent	 of	 the	 endorsement	 account	 does	 not	
need	 to	 take	 a	 stand	 on	 these	 largely	 empirical	 issues.	 For	 the	 endorsement	 account	
aims	to	explain	the	etiology	of	the	delusional	belief	and	not	the	etiology	of	the	delusional	
experience.	But	again,	what	matters	at	present	is	that	there	seems	to	be	nothing	wrong	
with	the	idea	that	Saks	could	have	an	experience	as	of	a	conscious	thought	that	belongs	
to	the	houses	even	if	she	were	not	currently	seeing	them.	
Maybe	one	could	 come	up	with	a	 theory	of	 self‐ascriptions	according	 to	which	we	
cannot	ascribe	our	own	conscious	mental	events	like	thoughts	to	an	alien	agent	X	if	X	is	
not	 bodily	 present	 in	 our	 vicinity.	 I	 am	 not	 claiming	 that	 there	 cannot	 be	 such	 a	
constitutive	link.	However,	 in	order	to	address	this	 issue,	one	would	need	to	provide	a	
more	 fully‐fledged	 theory	 of	 how	we	 usually	 self‐ascribe	 conscious	mental	 states	 like	
thoughts.	This	 is	a	complex	 issue	that	we	cannot	delve	 into	due	to	 lack	of	space.	But	 it	
seems	fair	to	contend	that	unless	reasons	for	such	a	theory	are	provided,	a	proponent	of	
the	endorsement	approach	is	free	to	reject	objection	3).	
To	sum	up:	Pickard’s	three	objections	do	not	force	one	to	analyse	the	attributional	
feature	 of	 delusions	 of	 thought‐insertion	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 additional	 cognitive‐
interpretative	layer.	The	idea	that	alien	agency	can	be	properly	experiential	still	stands.	
The	 last	 objection	 against	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 endorsement	model	 that	 I	would	 like	 to	
discuss	has	been	voiced	by	Matthew	Parrott	(2012).	His	basic	idea	is	that	schizophrenic	
patients	 express	 a	 sort	 of	 ambivalence	 toward	 their	 experiences	 of	 inserted	 thoughts.	
For	instance,	Frith’s	(1992)	patient	claims	that	the	inserted	thought	is	‘just	like	my	mind	
working,	 but	 it	 isn’t’,	 and	 the	 patient	 referred	 to	 by	 Hoerl	 (2001)	 reports	 that	 the	
inserted	 thoughts	seemed	 to	be	her	own	but	 they	are	also	different.	Parrott	 takes	 this	
kind	 of	 ambivalent	 attitude	 to	 be	 a	 characteristic	 feature	 of	 what	 it	 is	 like	 to	 have	
thought‐insertion	 experiences.	 With	 this	 idea	 in	 mind,	 he	 formulates	 the	 following	
objection:	
Recall	the	individual	who	reported	that	‘it's	just	like	my	mind	working,	but	it	isn't’.	Let's	
suppose	his	 experience	 does	 have	 the	 illusory	 content	 of	 <Chris	 is	 inserting	 thoughts	
into	my	head>.	This	might	explain	some	aspects	of	his	report	but	 it	would	not	explain	
why	 he	 takes	 the	 experience	 to	 be	 ‘just	 like’	 his	 mind	 working;	 indeed,	 it	 would	 be	
puzzling	why	the	person	felt	any	ambivalence	at	all	toward	the	alien	thought	…	How	are	
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we	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 an	 experience	 representing	 both	 a	 thought	 being	 inserted	 by	
someone	else	and	it	being	‘just	like	my	mind	working’?	These	two	elements	seem	to	be	
contraries.	How	could	they	both	be	simultaneously	represented	within	the	content	of	a	
single	experience?	
For	 the	sake	of	argument,	 let’s	accept	 that	some	patients	express	a	kind	of	ambivalent	
attitude	 toward	 their	 inserted	 thoughts.	 Contrary	 to	 what	 Parrott	 is	 suggesting,	
however,	 a	 proponent	 of	 the	 endorsement	 model	 has	 no	 problem	 capturing	 the	
ambivalence	at	stake.	As	I	shall	argue,	there	are	at	least	two	distinct	strategies	which	are	
available	to	the	endorsement	theorist.	
The	 first	possible	way	of	accounting	 for	 the	expressed	ambivalence	 is	 to	explain	 it	
not	in	terms	of	experiential	content,	but	by	reference	to	other	features	that	delusions	of	
thought‐insertion	 possess.	 One	 such	 feature	 would	 be	 the	 patient’s	 experiencing	 a	
dissociation	 between	 SoO	 and	 SoA.	We	 have	 seen	 that	 on	 the	 SoO	 and	 SoA	 approach,	
which	has	been	assumed	in	the	bulk	of	this	paper,	an	abnormal	sense	of	agency	is	a	key	
element	of	inserted	thoughts.	It	is	hence	to	be	expected	that	patients	who	experience	a	
disruption	between	SoO	and	SoA	express	an	ambivalent	attitude	toward	their	thoughts.	
After	 all,	 they	 are	 owner‐aware	 of	 their	 conscious	 thoughts	 but	 not	 agent‐aware.	
Another	 feature	 of	 such	 delusional	 mental	 states	 would	 be	 the	 patient’s	 background	
knowledge.	The	schizophrenic	patient	can	be	well	aware	of	the	distinction	between	her	
delusionary	world	and	the	real	world	(Bleuler,	1950).	That	is,	she	can	retain	awareness	
of	a	distinction	between	the	real,	inter‐subjective	world	and	the	imaginary	world	of	her	
delusions.	 This	 sort	 of	 double‐awareness	 might	 arguably	 give	 rise	 to	 a	 competitive	
tension	 between,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 endorsing	 the	 delusional	 experience	 and,	 on	 the	
other,	not	endorsing	it.	If	this	is	the	case,	it	is	quite	comprehensible	that	the	patient	will	
express	an	attitude	of	ambivalence	toward	her	inserted	thoughts.	10	
                                                 
10	This	response	suggests	that	the	kind	of	ambivalent	attitude	highlighted	by	Parrott	is	maybe	nothing	but	
a	specific	instance	of	the	more	general	phenomenon	of	what	has	sometimes	been	called	‘double	
orientation’	or	‘double	bookkeeping’	(Bleuler,	1950;	Sass,	2004,	in	press).	‘Double	bookkeeping’	is,	among	
other	things,	meant	to	refer	to	the	fact	that	schizophrenics	can	experience	their	delusional	reality	as	
existing	in	an	ontological	domain	which	is	distinct	from	everyday	reality.	It	seeks	to	pinpoint	a	sort	of	
‘double	awareness’	that	is	expressed	in	the	general	behaviour	of	schizophrenics.	It	therefore	seems	
probable	that	‘double	bookkeeping’	may	also	be	the	reason	why	patients	express	an	ambivalent	attitude	
toward	their	inserted	thoughts.	
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The	 important	 point	 highlighted	 by	 this	 first	 explanatory	 strategy	 is	 that	 the	
endorsement	model	 is	 not	 bound	 to	 explain	 all	 the	 features	 that	might	 be	 associated	
with	 inserted	 thoughts	 in	 terms	 of	 experiential	 content.	 The	 central	 claim	 of	 the	
endorsement	model	is	that	the	patient	comes	to	hold	the	delusional	belief	B	because	she	
doxastically	 endorses	 the	 content	 of	 her	 introspective‐cognitive	 experience.	 We	 have	
seen	 that	 the	definitional	 feature	of	 thought‐insertion	 is	 that	 alien	 thoughts	have	been	
put,	by	varied	means,	 into	the	subject’s	mind	(Mellor,	1970).	The	delusional	belief	B	 is	
what	 constitutes	 the	 core	 of	 the	 clinical	 phenomenon	 of	 thought‐insertion.	 The	
endorsement	model	must	therefore	explain	 it	 in	terms	of	experiential	content.	Yet	this	
does	not	 rule	 out	 that	 there	 can	be	 additional	 traits,	 such	 as	 the	 alleged	 ambivalence,	
which	 are	 more	 loosely	 attached	 to	 the	 overall	 phenomenology	 of	 thought‐insertion.	
Such	attributes	can	be	treated	as	peripheral	aspects	of	the	delusion.	Unlike	belief	B,	they	
are	not	essential	 to	the	clinical	diagnosis	of	 thought‐insertion.	 It	 is	 for	 this	reason	that	
the	endorsement	model	need	not	accommodate	them	in	terms	of	experiential	content.	
In	sum,	sympathisers	of	the	endorsement	account	are	at	liberty	to	explain	peripheral	
traits	of	what	it	is	like	to	experience	inserted	thoughts,	such	as	the	alleged	ambivalence,	
by	reference	 to	other	 features	of	 thought‐insertion.	The	dissociation	between	SoO	and	
SoA	 is	one	such	 feature,	and	 the	patient’s	 state	of	 ‘double	awareness’	may	be	another.	
And	even	though	not	all	aspects	of	the	delusional	belief	are	experientially	grounded	on	
this	 view,	 it	 still	 qualifies	 as	 a	 full‐blooded	 version	 of	 the	 endorsement	 account,	 for	 it	
explains	 the	 aspects	 which	 are	 definitional	 of	 the	 delusion	 of	 thought‐insertion	 with	
respect	to	experiential	content.	
The	second	strategy	which	is	in	principle	open	to	the	endorsement	theorist	is	simply	
to	 accept	 that	 ambivalence	 can	be	 grounded	 in	 the	 experiential	 content	but	deny	 that	
this	is	problematic	per	se.	Crane	(1988)	has	argued	that	the	famous	‘waterfall‐illusion’	is	
a	case	where	we	have	the	illusory	experience	as	of	an	object	moving	and	not	moving	at	
the	 same	 time.	 The	 waterfall‐illusion	 thus	 represents	 a	 concrete	 example	 where	 the	
content	of	the	experience	itself	is	contradictory.	Obviously,	Parrott’s	objection	does	not	
get	 off	 the	 ground	 if	 experiences	 with	 contradictory	 contents	 are	 possible.	 So	 all	 the	
endorsement	 theorist	has	 to	 stress	 is	 that	delusional	 experiences	of	 inserted	 thoughts	
are	 similar	 to	 the	waterfall‐illusion	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 they	 both	 involve	 contradictory	
contents.	 It	 is	 hence	 unproblematic	 to	 admit	 that	 the	 ambivalence	 expressed	 by	 the	
patient	may	be	grounded	in	the	content	of	the	anomalous	experience.	
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It	is	clear	that	this	second	strategy	is	also	a	full‐blooded	version	of	the	endorsement	
approach.	For	 it	has	 the	explanatory	resources	 to	account	 for	ambivalence	 in	 terms	of	
experiential	 content	 alone.	 That	 is,	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 content	 of	 the	 delusion	 are	
contained	within	the	experience	in	which	that	delusional	belief	is	grounded.	Regardless	
of	 whether	 one	 goes	 for	 the	 first	 or	 the	 second	 strategy,	 ambivalence	 is	 therefore	
perfectly	compatible	with	an	endorsement	approach	to	inserted	thoughts.	
	
4.	Conclusion	
This	ends	my	defence	of	the	coherence	of	the	endorsement	account	of	thought‐insertion.	
The	view	that	I	have	been	defending	claims	that	the	patient’s	attribution	of	the	inserted	
thoughts	 to	 an	 external	 agent	 need	 not	 be	 the	 result	 of	 an	 attempt	 to	 rationalise	 and	
explain	 the	 unusual	 experience,	 i.e.,	 a	 sort	 of	 ex	 post	 story‐telling,	 self‐referential	
productive	narrative,	confabulation,	or	abductive	inference.	Instead,	it	has	been	argued	
that	 the	 attributional	 component	 of	 thought‐insertion	 can	 be	 part	 and	 parcel	 of	 the	
experience’s	 basic	 content.	 If	 this	 is	 correct,	 then	 it	 follows	 that	 the	 endorsement	
approach	 to	 delusions	 expresses	 a	 serious	 position	when	 it	 comes	 to	 determining	 the	
experiential	content	of	inserted	thoughts.	The	upshot	of	fleshing	out	patients’	reports	in	
this	 way	 is	 that	 schizophrenic	 patients	 can	 disown	 and	 attribute	 some	 of	 their	 own	
occurrent	 conscious	 thoughts	 to	 external	 agents	 just	 because	 they	 first‐personally	
experience	their	thoughts	as	being	inserted	by	some	alien	cognitive	agent.	They	simply	
trust	 their	experiences.	The	unusual	experience	can	 therefore	be	a	 reason‐giving	state	
that	grounds	the	patient’s	delusional	belief.	It	 is	 in	this	sense	that	patients’	reports	are	
expressive	of	broadly	rational	doxastic	responses	to	highly	unusual	experiences.	
Finally,	although	I	argued	that	the	arguments	against	the	endorsement	approach	to	
inserted	 thoughts	 are	not	 convincing,	 I	 did	not	put	 forward	positive	 arguments	which	
would	show	that	the	endorsement	model	is	preferable	to	rival	explanatory	models,	such	
as	explanationism	or	rationalism.	It	is	clear	that	a	full‐blown	defence	of	the	endorsement	
approach	to	delusions	of	 thought‐insertion	would	have	to	engage	in	such	a	discussion.	
But	whether	and	how	this	can	be	done	must	be	the	task	of	another	paper.	
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